ocessing. Implications for a scientific definition and typology of love are discussed.
Prototype theory has provided insights into concepts central
to psychology, including behavioral act (Buss & Craik, 1983),
personality trait (Cantor & Mischel, 1979), intelligence (Neisser,
1979), social situation (Cantor, Mischel, & Schwartz, 1982), and
environmental setting (Tversky & Hemenway, 1983). The theory
has inspired important new approaches to psychiatric diagnosis (Cantor, Smith, French, & Mezzich, 1980) and personality
assessment (Broughton, 1984). The studies reported in this article are part of a larger project designed to explore the applicability of prototype theory to the domain of emotion concepts.
We had two related purposes. The first was to use the tools of
prototype theory to throw light on the elusive concept of love.
We shall have something to say about both the definition of and
typologies of love. The second purpose concerned prototype
theory itself. Prior demonstrations of a prototype structure in
concepts focused on superordinate concepts, such as fruit, vehicle, or emotion. Would the same results occur, we asked, for
basic-level concepts, such as apple, truck, or love? We shall
begin with the second issue.
Portions of this research were presented at the Annual Convention
of the Canadian Psychological Association, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, June 1988.
This research was supported by a University of Winnipeg Group II
grant (4100-000) awarded to Beverley Fehr and by a grant from the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada to James
A. Russell.
We thank Pat Keelan and Sandra Wolfram for their assistance in
data coding and Jim Averill, Michael Mascolo, and Phil Shaver for
helpful comments on a draft of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Beverley Fehr, Department of Psychology, University of Winnipeg,
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, R3B 2E9, or James A. Russell, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall,
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T1Y7.
Prototype Approach
Traditionally, the general terms of a language were thought to
denote categories of objects or events, each member of which
possessed features that were each necessary and together sufficient to define membership in that category. According to this
classical view, to know the meaning (sense) of a general term
(i.e., to have the concept associated with it) was to know at least
implicitly these necessary and sufficient features. A definition
could therefore be formulated by philosophical discussion or—
because the defining features were also in the objects or events
—by empirical investigation.
Although some writers continue to defend the classical view
(Armstrong, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1983; Harnad, 1987;
Osherson & Smith, 1981), considerable psychological research
reinforces a growing skepticism over its plausibility as an adequate account of most concepts used in everyday speech and
thought (Medin, 1989; Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Smith & Medin,
1981). Rosch's (1975,1977,1978) proposal of a prototype account as an alternative to the classical view was followed by
various nonclassical accounts (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Lakoff, 1987; Medin, 1989; Neisser, 1987; Smith & Medin, 1981).
Indeed, in one account, concepts are thought of not only as
ill-defined but as varying from one person to the next, and, for
the same person, from one time to the next (Barsalou, 1987).
We make no attempt in this article to differentiate within this
family of nonclassical accounts. Rather, our purpose is to continue to specify through empirical means the properties of
emotion concepts.
In previous research, we have compared the classical with the
prototype view in the domain of emotion (Fehr, 1982,1988;
Fehr & Russell, 1984; Fehr, Russell, & Ward, 1982; Russell,
1991; Russell & Bullock, 1986), but we are not alone in this
interest. Indeed, writers as far back as William James (1890/
1950,1902/1929) have viewed emotion concepts in a way more
compatible with a prototype than
Prototype theory has provided insights into concepts central
to psychology, including behavioral act (Buss & Craik, 1983),
personality trait (Cantor & Mischel, 1979), intelligence (Neisser,
1979), social situation (Cantor, Mischel, & Schwartz, 1982), and
environmental setting (Tversky & Hemenway, 1983). The theory
has inspired important new approaches to psychiatric diagnosis (Cantor, Smith, French, & Mezzich, 1980) and personality
assessment (Broughton, 1984). The studies reported in this article are part of a larger project designed to explore the applicability of prototype theory to the domain of emotion concepts.
We had two related purposes. The first was to use the tools of
prototype theory to throw light on the elusive concept of love.
We shall have something to say about both the definition of and
typologies of love. The second purpose concerned prototype
theory itself. Prior demonstrations of a prototype structure in
concepts focused on superordinate concepts, such as fruit, vehicle, or emotion. Would the same results occur, we asked, for
basic-level concepts, such as apple, truck, or love? We shall
begin with the second issue.
Portions of this research were presented at the Annual Convention
of the Canadian Psychological Association, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, June 1988.
This research was supported by a University of Winnipeg Group II
grant (4100-000) awarded to Beverley Fehr and by a grant from the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada to James
A. Russell.
We thank Pat Keelan and Sandra Wolfram for their assistance in
data coding and Jim Averill, Michael Mascolo, and Phil Shaver for
helpful comments on a draft of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Beverley Fehr, Department of Psychology, University of Winnipeg,
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, R3B 2E9, or James A. Russell, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall,
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T1Y7.
Prototype Approach
Traditionally, the general terms of a language were thought to
denote categories of objects or events, each member of which
possessed features that were each necessary and together sufficient to define membership in that category. According to this
classical view, to know the meaning (sense) of a general term
(i.e., to have the concept associated with it) was to know at least
implicitly these necessary and sufficient features. A definition
could therefore be formulated by philosophical discussion or—
because the defining features were also in the objects or events
—by empirical investigation.
Although some writers continue to defend the classical view
(Armstrong, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1983; Harnad, 1987;
Osherson & Smith, 1981), considerable psychological research
reinforces a growing skepticism over its plausibility as an adequate account of most concepts used in everyday speech and
thought (Medin, 1989; Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Smith & Medin,
1981). Rosch's (1975,1977,1978) proposal of a prototype account as an alternative to the classical view was followed by
various nonclassical accounts (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Lakoff, 1987; Medin, 1989; Neisser, 1987; Smith & Medin, 1981).
Indeed, in one account, concepts are thought of not only as
ill-defined but as varying from one person to the next, and, for
the same person, from one time to the next (Barsalou, 1987).
We make no attempt in this article to differentiate within this
family of nonclassical accounts. Rather, our purpose is to continue to specify through empirical means the properties of
emotion concepts.
In previous research, we have compared the classical with the
prototype view in the domain of emotion (Fehr, 1982,1988;
Fehr & Russell, 1984; Fehr, Russell, & Ward, 1982; Russell,
1991; Russell & Bullock, 1986), but we are not alone in this
interest. Indeed, writers as far back as William James (1890/
1950,1902/1929) have viewed emotion concepts in a way more
compatible with a prototype than
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